

<http://dx.doi.org/10.17951/kw.2021.32.187-204>

## ***Patriotism* Concept by Jędrzej Stanisławek**

Robert Boroch

 <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2016-5449>

Considering the idea of patriotism in Polish philosophical discourse is challenging for several reasons. The most challenging is its explication as a general idea. However, this seems to be the biggest challenge mainly because patriotism has become a socially coercive category of the political discourse of the right. Therefore, it appears that any debate addressing the issue of clarifying the essence of patriotism will sooner or later turn into a form of social activism and open political struggle. Consequently, it is not surprising, that in populist philosophies, categories such as patriotism, identity, nationality, ethnicity, or nationalism take on various semantic dimensions that substantially impact social attitudes towards the ruling elite. In this sense, patriotism can also be defined as a form of power over the individual, whose actions must be subordinated to the majority's will. This essay discusses the propositions introduced by a contemporary Polish philosopher Jędrzej Stanisławek in an article titled "Patriotism" ("Patriotyzm"). Stanisławek is concerned with the accuracy of the argumentation that supports the populist model. Nevertheless, let us note that what is described in this article as populist philosophy is accepted by a few prominent intellectuals and philosophers associated with the Warsaw School of Philosophy of Ideas, as evidenced by the publication of Stanisławek's article in one of the significant peer-reviewed Polish philosophical journals – *Edukacja Filozoficzna* (*Philosophical Education*). My focus will be on the validity of Stanisławek's association between patriotism and Darwinian determinism

Keywords: Jędrzej Stanisławek; political philosophy, moral philosophy, ethics, patriotism

---

ROBERT BOROCH, PhD, University of Warsaw; address for correspondence: University of Warsaw, Faculty of Applied Linguistics, Department of Intercultural Studies of Central and Eastern Europe, 55 Dobra Street, 00-312 Warsaw, Poland; e-mail: rboroch@uw.edu.pl

## 1. Introduction

Starting to consider the idea of patriotism in Polish philosophical discourse is challenging for several reasons. The most challenging is compromising its explication as a general idea. However, this seems impossible mainly because patriotism has become a socially coercive category of the right in public discourse. Therefore, it appears that any debate addressing the issue of clarifying the essence of patriotism will sooner or later turn into a form of social activism and open political struggle. Consequently, it is not surprising that in populist philosophies, categories such as patriotism, identity, nationality, ethnicity, or nationalism take on various semantical dimensions that substantially impact social attitudes towards the ruling elite. In this sense, patriotism can also be a form of power over the individual, whose actions must be subordinated to the majority's will about obedience to customs in the first place, then obeying the state law, both of which represent the ruling class. This essay argues with the propositions introduced by contemporary Polish philosopher Jędrzej Stanisławek in an article titled "Patriotism" ("Patriotyzm").<sup>1</sup> The spectrum of arguments concerns the relevance of argumentation which contributes to a populist pattern.

Nevertheless, let us note that what we describe in this article as populist philosophy is accepted by a few prominent intellectuals and philosophers associated with the Warsaw School of Philosophy of Ideas – as evidenced by the publication of Stanisławek's article in one of the leading peer-reviewed Polish philosophical journals – *Edukacja Filozoficzna* (*Philosophical Education*). The spectrum of arguments concerns the appropriateness of affirming the prospect of patriotism as a Darwinian determinism. Moreover, contradictory argumentation is evident concerning the above submission.

However, the question arises as to why we are engaged in a critique of Stanisławek's proposals? Firstly, Jędrzej Stanisławek was a long-time participant in seminars led by Bogusław Wolniewicz (1927–2017);<sup>2</sup> Jędrzej

---

<sup>1</sup> Jędrzej Stanisławek, "Patriotyzm," *Edukacja Filozoficzna* 2018, no. 66: 51–63.

<sup>2</sup> Bogusław Wolniewicz (1927–2017) philosopher and logician, creator of the ontology of situations.

Stanisławek is also regarded as one of the epigones of Wolniewicz's philosophy. Secondly, a four-volume selection of Bogusław Wolniewicz's writings was published for the second time in 2018, which indicates an interest in his philosophy (Wolniewicz 2018). Furthermore, Stanisławek is a prominent author of monographs: *Ethics. Guidebook for a primary school teacher* (*Etyka. Poradnik dla nauczyciela szkoły podstawowej*), *Basics of Logic* (*Podstawy logiki*), *Logic in didactics* (*Logika w dydaktyce*), *Basics of Philosophy* (*Podstawy filozofii*), *Basics of statistics* (*Podstawy statystyki*). Finally, publication in such a central journal as *Edukacja Filozoficzna* suggests that the article reflects the current and relevant state of philosophical and scientific knowledge.

## 2. Reconstruction of the theory

### 2.1. "Relationship to one's own group"

The key issue in the dispute is the division of social groups (see figure 1) of biological and cultural origins. Examples of groups that contain a biological root are families and clans. Accordingly, examples of groups that included cultural factors are a community of destiny as social classes and a community of ideas as a monastery.




Figure 1: Division of communities in Stanisławek's philosophy<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Stanisławek, "Patriotyzm," 52.

*Figure 1* shows the subdivision of social communities adopted by Stanisławek as a basis for his reasoning. Footnote 4 on page 52, contains an important statement: “The institution of clans functioned not only in the Paleolithic but also, for example, in the Middle Ages and modern times. The aristocracy nurtured it. For the Radziwił, their interests were more important than those of the state.”<sup>4</sup>

This proposition assumes that the foundation of communities is biological propensity (Stanisławek’s term) and the innate emotions associated with a biological predisposition, e.g., “the inherent tendency to support one’s”.<sup>5</sup>

This part closes with the assertion that the support of one of the distinguished groups – a biological group or a cultural group – is conditional on upbringing. Furthermore, communities are perpetuated by cultural connections, namely – a common language and customs, therefore cultural communities are inferior in durability to biological communities.

## 2.2. “Nation” and “homeland”

“Nation” and “homeland” emerged from the first agricultural revolution that changed human lifestyle from nomadic to sedentary. That process transforms, argues Stanisławek, primitive hordes into tribes.<sup>6</sup> However, this leads Stanisławek to adopt hypothesis:

[1] (Nations — RB) “[...] arose in areas where states had previously emerged.”<sup>7</sup>

Therefore, a homeland is perceived neither as a geographical nor cultural entity. Instead, homeland consists of material and intangible dimensions, e.g., material dimensions are home. In contrast, intangible dimensions are common contacts or customs. Therefore, one does not become a fellow of a nation voluntarily but only by birth.

---

<sup>4</sup> Ibidem, 52.

<sup>5</sup> Ibidem.


<sup>6</sup> Ibidem, 52–53.

<sup>7</sup> Ibidem, 53.

[2] One becomes a fellow of a nation alone of one's will. Everyone is born into a certain household, and that family is always a component of a nation.<sup>8</sup>

### 2.3. "Attitudes towards one's own group"

The subsequent analysis of the human relationship to the motherland community is shown in *Figure 2*.



*Figure 2*: Attitude towards one's group<sup>9</sup>

The proposed division is based on two criteria: (1) solidarity; and (2) lack of solidarity.

[3] Individualists break servitude to a group. Individualists accept that everyone has the privilege to do what is good for them. Therefore, they can shift from supporting the group if they wish to do so.<sup>10</sup>

It is therefore proposed that solidarity is contrary to individualism. What is visible in *Figure 2* is that solidarity is gradable, which manifests itself in the importance of supporting a group whatever the cost.

---

<sup>8</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>9</sup> Ibidem, 52–53.

<sup>10</sup> Ibidem, 53.

The strong form of solidarity is patriotism, while the extreme form of solidarity is nationalism.<sup>11</sup>

#### **2.4. “Suspension of partialism”<sup>12</sup>**

Cosmopolitanism and internationalism are factors that disintegrate group solidarity:

[4] The cosmopolitan does not feel herself or themselves to be a member of any nation.<sup>13</sup>

[5] The internationalist stands in solidarity with a certain group formed from subgroups found in different nations.<sup>14</sup>

Both cosmopolitanism and internationalism do not create strong group bonds – the opposite of such social attitudes is national communities.<sup>15</sup>

#### **2.5. “Patriotism and nationalism”**

The categories of patriotism and nationalism are alike in numerous ways. However, these categories differ when it comes to supreme values — honour, family prosperity, freedom. The supreme value for patriots is the glory of the fatherland/motherland. The supreme value for nationalists is the power of the nation.<sup>16</sup>

[6] According to nationalists, there is a supreme value, and that is the power of the nation.<sup>17</sup>

---

<sup>11</sup> Ibidem, 54.

<sup>12</sup> A term introduced by Stanisławek without providing its definition. The Polish language dictionary does not register such a lexical unit.

<sup>13</sup> Stanisławek, “Patriotyzm,” 54.

<sup>14</sup> Ibidem, 55.


<sup>15</sup> Ibidem, 56.

<sup>16</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>17</sup> Ibidem.

[7] Patriots [...]. For them, [...] the supreme value is the glory of the homeland.<sup>18</sup>

The differences between patriotism and nationalism are shown in *Figure 3*.



*Figure 3: Patriotism and nationalism — dissimilarities*<sup>19</sup>

The sanctions against non-compliant people are a key element of the proposed division. Nationalism is positioned as offensive in this aspect, while patriotism is positioned as defensive. Nationalism attacks everyone, both its own and foreign, who poses a threat to the core value, which is the power of the nation. Nationalism seeks to dominate or subdue strangers to national power. Patriotism, to the contrary, evokes a sense of awe in strangers. This sense of awe makes it possible to win the favour of strangers.

## 2.6. “Reasoning of patriotism”

The reasoning of patriotism is presented through three general arguments: (1) **formal** — for the patriot, the homeland is an intrinsic value from which the patriotism concept arises. Intrinsic values need no justification (Stanisławek 2018, 59); (2) **moral** — “[...] thanks to the homeland we are who


<sup>18</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>19</sup> Ibidem, 57.

we are and yet, we would not want to be someone else: Swede, German, Russian, Austrian” (Stanisławek 2018, 59); and (3) **practical** — “[...] other nations have their patriots, thanks to whom they become better”.<sup>20</sup> An additional argument is also given (4) “what is ours (e.g., what is Polish) is better, more beautiful than foreign”<sup>21</sup> thus Stanisławek’s argument is substantively arguable, therefore not discussed further.<sup>22</sup>

## 2.7. “Forms of patriotism versus forms of culture”

There are three forms of culture: primitive culture, traditional culture, and contemporary culture. The primitive culture is characterised by xenophobia, collectivism and sexuality. Traditional culture is characterised by idealism, asceticism and elitism. Modern culture is characterised by egalitarianism, utilitarianism, hedonism, and self-centeredness’. An example of primitive culture is the family; traditional culture, ideological communities (e.g., monasteries), and contemporary culture is explained through the slogan “homeland is where we eat”.<sup>23</sup> *Figure 4* shows the questions and answers regarding the value of the power of nation in the context of cultural forms.



*Figure 4:* Responses to the question on the value of a nation’s power<sup>24</sup>

<sup>20</sup> Ibidem, 59.

<sup>21</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>22</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>23</sup> Ibidem, 59–60.

<sup>24</sup> Ibidem, 60.



## 2.8. “The nationalism of our era”

The emergence of nationalism is a consequence of the rise of nations. The most critical factor in developing nationalism was Darwin’s theory of evolution, published in 1859 in his work *On the Origin of Species*. The contemporary causes of nationalism relate to aggressive capital, eliminating differences and national peculiarities and transforming humanity into a workforce.

Great nations hold the right to nationalism in the modern aspect – “the nationalism of small nations is ridiculous.”<sup>25</sup> In Poland, the period of nationalism was between 1918-1939 – The twenty-year interwar period – “the defeat in September [1939 – RB] disgraced them. Instead of Poland “from the sea to sea” they lived to see the fourth partition of Poland. The Poles are not a nation of any great merit to the world.”

## 2.9. “Patriotism of a young person”

This point contains recommendations for young people:

- 1) in the period of armed conflict, do not die recklessly, as youth will be needed in rebuilding the country after the war.
- 2) in the period of the loss of independence (cf. partitions), study and care for the development and beauty of the national language.
- 3) behave with dignity and politeness when abroad (e.g., give up one's seat on a tram to elderly people, saying “please sit down” in Polish).
- 4) take care of the pride of the homeland by refraining from vandalism in public spaces; take a pro-ecological approach to the homeland.<sup>26</sup>

## 3. Outline

Points 2.1. to 2.9. reconstruct the main concepts of the Stanisławek proposal. However, points 2.1. to 2.7. are philosophical. Therefore, only points 2.1. to 2.7 will be subject to critical comment.

---

<sup>25</sup> Ibidem, 61.

<sup>26</sup> Ibidem, 62.

In summary, the premises discussed in sections 2.1–2.7 are as follows:

[1] (Nations – RB) [...] arose in areas where states had previously emerged.<sup>27</sup>

[2] An individual becomes a fellow of the nation independently of one's own will.<sup>28</sup>

[3] Individualists break servitude to a group. Individualists accept that everyone has the privilege to do what is good for them. Therefore, they can shift from supporting the group if they wish to do so.<sup>29</sup>

[4] The cosmopolitan does not feel themselves to be a member of any nation.<sup>30</sup>

[5] The internationalist stands in solidarity with a certain group formed from subgroups found in different nations.<sup>31</sup>

[6] According to nationalists, there is a supreme value, and that is the power of the nation.<sup>32</sup>

[7] Patriots [...]. For them, [...] the supreme value is the glory of the homeland.<sup>33</sup>

## 4. Counterarguments

### 4.1. Material error and contradictory hypotheses

The factors hindering the reception of the article are as follows – the first is the technical aspect, which refers to the writing style, i.e., colloquiality of language<sup>34</sup>. Nonetheless, this may be overlooked. However, we cannot ignore

---

<sup>27</sup> Ibidem, 53.

<sup>28</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>29</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>30</sup> Ibidem, 54.

<sup>31</sup> Ibidem, 55.

<sup>32</sup> Ibidem, 56.

<sup>33</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>34</sup> By colloquial language I mean language devoid of the specialist terms of a particular scientific discipline, which makes it ambiguous, metaphorical, poor in descriptive content and vague.

hypotheses containing a material error – premise [1]<sup>35</sup> or mutually exclusive assumptions – premises [2] and [4].

#### 4.1.1. Material error — premise [1]

The premise [1] is subject to material error — recall:

[1] (Nations — RB) [...] arose in areas where states had previously emerged.<sup>36</sup>

A nation is a concept functioning in two areas of scientific knowledge: political science and anthropology. In political science, the meaning of the term nation derives from the philosophy of politics to denote a political community of beliefs. In anthropology, the meaning of the term is broader, owing to the specificity of the research interests of this discipline,

When it comes to the concept of the nation, anthropology bases its research assumptions on empirical evidence, distancing itself from the argument of the primordial horde. The argument of the primordial horde is formulated by analogy.

The prototype of this analogy is the organisation of the Tatar horde – the argument, however, is not sufficiently substantiated.<sup>37</sup> In this sense, the horde refers to belief and not truth. Yet, let us put that aside and consider the facts.

It is known from historical accounts that human societies organise themselves into large social groups – see the chronicles of the Sumerians, the earliest known civilization – c. 2500 BC or the Chinese chronicles of the Warring Kingdoms period – c. 480 BC to 221 BC.<sup>38</sup>

However, the mere fact of their organisation is not sufficient for the

---

<sup>35</sup> Material error is an error in conclusion accepting a false premise as accurate.

<sup>36</sup> Stanisławek, “Patriotyzm,” 53.

<sup>37</sup> The term was used by Charles Darwin in his book *The Descent of Man* (1871) to describe early social structures that were between states of nature, unknown reality and states of culture. See “Primitive Horde,” <https://www.encyclopedia.com/psychology/dictionaries-thesauruses-pictures-and-press-releases/primitive-horde> (accessed: 05.04.2022).

<sup>38</sup> See Steven Grosby, *Nationalism. A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Kindle, 2005), chapter 2.

existence of a nation; the latter being a necessary condition for the idea of patriotism. Stanisławek's explanation is insufficient. Stanisławek did not consider two critical factors in his proposal: (1) **collective consciousness** that refers to “[...] social relationships of entities participating in a progressively changing tradition;” and (2) **collective self-consciousness** that refers to “[...] recognizing and differentiating cultural diversity: traditions, values [...].”<sup>39</sup> All abstract social concepts are stored in collective memory. In contrast, collective self-consciousness is a factor that makes it possible to perceive social reality in terms of “native” – “stranger”<sup>40</sup> According to Steven Grosby, the requirements for the existence of a nation are discerned by integrative aspects such as (1) common ancestor, (2) common history, (3) culture, and (4) residence of a particular territory. What is more, S. Grosby reasons that in different social organisations, human actions, although similar, are irrespective of ethnicity, e.g., trade, monotheism or political unity.<sup>41</sup>

The emergence of state organisation requires additional factors other than Darwinian determinism. A state is a politically organised community inhabiting a territory defined by its borders, over which governments have control. That authority is independent and sovereign. Moreover, rules enact a law, even customs, and execute obedience. Needless to say, the state can establish trade routes or political and military allies.<sup>42</sup>

To sum up, the assertion, that the state is the essential condition for developing a nation, is inaccurate. This assertion is conflicting with empirical evidence, —for example, there are nations without a country, such as the Kurds.<sup>43</sup>

Premise [1] should not be discussed at all as it is false – The Çatalhöyük settlement (c. 8000 BC) was not a political-military organisation but a social organisation established during the Neolithic period.<sup>44</sup> Archaeological evidence

---

<sup>39</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>40</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>41</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>42</sup> See Bogumił Szmulik, Marek Żmigrodzki, *Wprowadzenie do nauki o państwie i polityce* (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 2003), chapter 1.

<sup>43</sup> Grosby, *Nationalism*, chapter 2.

<sup>44</sup> See Michael Balter, *The Goddess and the Bull: Çatalhöyük: An Archaeological Journey to the Dawn of Civilization* (Routledge: Kindle, 2016), chapter 4-9.

ends any speculation on the state's priority over the nation. However, modern politicians want the situation to be reversed. The idea of a nation is an abstract entity that has been put into practice

#### 4.1.2. Contradictory — premises [2] and [4]

Premises [2] and [4] are mutually exclusive. This means that the following phenomena cannot occur simultaneously:

[2] An individual becomes a member of the nation independently of one's own will.<sup>45</sup>

[4] The cosmopolitan does not feel themselves to be a member of any nation.<sup>46</sup>

Premise [2] Assumes that nationality is independent of a person's will. It is given by birth. On the other hand, the hypothesis [4] allows freedom of choice. Two positions within one argument clash, which excludes the condition of coherence.

The methodology adopted by Stanisławek is logically and analytically inconsistent because it mixes the philosophical order with the legal order. The essential feature of the state is the compulsion to belong to what the state law regulates. From a legal point of view, there are two approaches: (1) *ius sanguinis*, *ius soli* — granted citizenship by birth; or (2) *ius matrimonii*, *naturalization* — granted citizenship by naturalization. The legal status of a person has been completely ignored by Stanisławek. The contradiction in premises [2] and [4] indicates inconsistent or careless, sloppy to dopey thinking and constructing a theory of patriotism based on widespread popular opinions.

#### 4.2. Manipulation

The omission of the current state of knowledge by Stanisławek is a case for concern. This paper does not aim to discuss the concept of patriotism in the Warsaw School of Ideas, that Stanisławek presumably symbolizes.

---

<sup>45</sup> Stanisławek, "Patriotyzm," 53.

<sup>46</sup> Ibidem 54.

It should be noted that the journal *Edukacja Filozoficzna* is a peer-reviewed journal, published by the University of Warsaw at the Institute of Philosophy. Thus, it can be assumed that the articles reflect the current state of scientific and philosophical knowledge, but unfortunately, this is not the case with Stanisławek's piece. Therefore, some examples that indicate the validity of the above criticisms should be discussed.

#### 4.2.1. Biological susceptibility

The initial premises of the inquired theory of patriotism ignore the actual state of facts – an example of such premise.

The basis of community is biological inclination. The emotions associated with it are inherent.<sup>47</sup>

The above quotation contains two judgments. The first one, which includes the term “biological inclination,” is unclear due to the meaning of the term not being explained.<sup>48</sup> The second judgement concerns the inheritance of emotions through a biological pathway, which is a false assumption. The falseness of this approach has been demonstrated by Paul Ekman.<sup>49</sup>

Basic emotions and their mimetic expressions are common to all people regardless of their ethnic group, phenotype, or social status. These emotions result from the influence of cultural and social factors, not biological ones. A burning question about the inheritance of a tendency to, for example, depression or affective states is not addressed. Is it the case that considering the social life of a human being, which manifests itself by adopting certain attitudes towards the phenomena taking place, one can derive the idea of solidarity with one's kin group, consequently, the concept of patriotism?

Let's agree with the above view on a trial basis. A consequence of this agreement is the necessity to consider the so-called “molecular modelling of

---

<sup>47</sup> Ibidem, 52.

<sup>48</sup> Nor is it possible to determine what the term “biological propensity” means from the broader context.

<sup>49</sup> See Paul Ekman, *Emotions Revealed. Recognizing Faces and Feelings to Improve Communication and Emotional Life* (New York: Holt Paperbacks, 2004).

society,” i.e. social cybernetics. Such a discussion about developing the qualities of the new man and citizen is not unique. Problems of social modelling have been discussed both in philosophy and politics. In this aspect, less is said about the significant threats to “humanistic security,” for example, the security of the human person as an individual. As a basis for designing a new society, Darwinian determinism forces an axiological redefinition of axiological ideas. Altruism,<sup>50</sup> for example, or an extreme view of genetic sexual attractiveness.<sup>51</sup> The Darwinian paradigm of survival of the stronger had practical consequences in the form of the criminal research of Alfred Ploetz and Alfred Grotjahn – the founders of eugenics and racial purity (Ger. *Rassenhygiene*)<sup>52</sup> and genetic programmes such as *Lebensborn*.<sup>53</sup>

This point does not exhaust all matters regarding Stanisławek's proposal, for example, the incorrect etymology of the word homeland or detachment of concepts from the Polish semantic and semiotic context. The lack of an analytical approach to the consequences of the bases of reasoning adopted is surprising.

## 5. Conclusion

Richard Price's 1798 work *A Discourse on Love of Our Country* should be recalled. This British political activist borrowed a conceptualization of patriotic relations from the Stoics – Seneca and Cicero. The conceptualization of patriotism develops through the extension of ideas from family, relatives, through the state, to humanism and humanity. This political conceptualization of patriotism spread among philosophers and the very model of gradual

---

<sup>50</sup> See Daniel C. Batson, *A Scientific Search for Altruism: Do We Only Care About Ourselves?* (Oxford: Kindle, 2018).

<sup>51</sup> See Barbara Gonyo, “Genetic Sexual Attraction,” *The Decree* 1987, no. 4: 12–18.

<sup>52</sup> See Susanne Hahn, Georg Lilienthal, “Totentanz und Lebensborn: Zur Geschichte des Alters- und Pflegeheimes in Kohren-Sahlis bei Leipzig (1939–1945),” *Medizinhistorisches Journal* 27, no. 3-4 (1992): 340–358.

<sup>53</sup> See Vandana Joshi, “Maternalism, Race, Class and Citizenship: Aspects of Illegitimate Motherhood in Nazi Germany,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 46, no. 4 (2011): 832–853.

conceptualization of patriotism appeared permanently in political philosophy as an adequate model of self-conceptual broadening of concepts, – in Polish philosophical literature, it is called the concept-sphere.

It is also worth mentioning, that the presented theory of patriotism is contradictory to what is shown in point 4.1.2.

This theory includes personal beliefs rather than social facts as defined or explained by Émile Durkheim – and concerning the shaping process of mono-ethnic or multi-ethnic nations in which the nation seeks the essence of the state, or the state seeks the heart of the nation.<sup>54</sup> These two directions of the formation of nations were left out.

The contested article was published in one of the leading Polish philosophical journals. This journal acts as the intellectual voice of the Warsaw School of Philosophy of Ideas. It is therefore expected that the argument presented will be substantial and factual and not riddled with contradictions. This, in turn, precludes Stanisławek's proposal from being taken thoughtfully. What becomes apparent in Stanisławek's article is the social propaganda impact and the attempt to develop a philosophical ground for the uncomplicated nationalism ideology emerging in this backdrop. The truth, however, may be more prosaic. Whatever the reason, intellectuals should view it with caution.

## Bibliography

- Balter, Michael. *The Goddess and the Bull: Çatalhöyük: An Archaeological Journey to the Dawn of Civilization*. Kindle Edition: Routledge, 2016.
- Batson, C. Daniel. *A Scientific Search for Altruism: Do We Only Care About Ourselves?* Oxford: Kindle, 2018.
- Ekman, Paul. *Emotions Revealed. Recognizing Faces and Feelings to Improve Communication and Emotional Life*. New York: Holt Paperbacks, 2004.
- Gonyo, Barbara. "Genetic Sexual Attraction." *The Decree* 1987, no. 4: 12–18.
- Grosby, Steven. *Nationalism. A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Kindle, 2005.
- Hahn, Susanne, Georg Lilienthal. "Totentanz und Lebensborn: Zur Geschichte des Alters- und Pflegeheimes in Kohren-Sahlisbei Leipzig (1939–1945)." *Medizinhistorisches Journal* 27, no. 3-4 (1992): 340–358.

---

<sup>54</sup> See Barbara Szacka, *Wprowadzenie do socjologii* (Warszawa: Oficyna Naukowa, 2003), 237–267.



- Joshi, Vandana. "Maternalism, Race, Class and Citizenship: Aspects of Illegitimate Motherhood in Nazi Germany." *Journal of Contemporary History* 46, no. 4 (2011): 832–853.
- Szacka, Barbara. *Wprowadzenie do socjologii*. Warszawa: Oficyna Naukowa, 2003.
- Stanisławek, Jędrzej. "Patriotyzm." *Edukacja Filozoficzna* 2018, no. 66: 51–63.
- Szmulik, Bogumił, Marek Żmigrodzki. *Wprowadzenie do nauki o państwie i polityce*. Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 2003.
- Wolniewicz, Bogusław. *Filozofia i Wartości*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2018.

## Streszczenie

### Koncepcja patriotyzmu według Jędrzeja Stanisławka

Rozpatrywanie idei patriotyzmu w polskim dyskursie filozoficznym jest trudne z kilku powodów. Największą trudność stanowi opis idei patriotyzmu w kategoriach ogólnych. Powodem tego jest praktyka traktowania patriotyzmu jako jednej z kategorii przymusu społecznego demonstrującego określone zachowania i postawy społeczne w pravicowym obozie politycznym. Można domniemywać, że w tym kontekście każda debata podejmująca się zadania eksplikacji istoty idei patriotyzmu prędzej czy później przekształci się w formę aktywizmu społecznego i otwartą rywalizację polityczną. Nie jest zaskoczeniem, że w nurtach populistycznych filozofii politycznych takie kategorie, jak patriotyzm, tożsamość, narodowość, etniczność i nacjonalizm przybierają różne wymiary semantyczne, które wpływają na postawy społeczne rządzących elit. W tym też aspekcie patriotyzm można rozumieć jako formę dominacji władzy nad jednostką, której działania w ramach grupy społecznej muszą być podporządkowane woli większości. W niniejszym eseju omówione zostały tezy, które przedstawił współczesny polski filozof Jędrzej Stanisławek w artykule zatytułowanym Patriotyzm. Spektrum kontestowanego artykułu dotyczy adekwatności argumentacji, która utrwała wzorzec populistyczny patriotyzmu. Niemniej zauważmy, że to, co zostało w niniejszym polemicznym artykule przedstawione jest akceptowane przez kilku wybitnych intelektualistów i filozofów związanych z warszawską szkołą filozofii idei – o czym świadczy kontestowana publikacja J. Stanisławka ogłoszona w „Edukacji Filozoficznej” – jednym z ważnych polskich czasopism filozoficznych. Spektrum dyskusji dotyczy także zasadności afirmacji perspektywy patriotyzmu w kategorii darwinowskiego determinizmu, którą prezentuje J. Stanisławek.

Słowa kluczowe: Jędrzej Stanisławek, filozofia polityczna, filozofia moralna, etyka, patriotyzm

## Zusammenfassung

### Das Konzept des Patriotismus nach Jędrzej Stanisławek

Die Idee des Patriotismus im polnischen philosophischen Diskurs zu betrachten ist aus mehreren Gründen schwierig. Die größte Schwierigkeit besteht in der Beschreibung der Idee des Patriotismus im Allgemeinen. Das resultiert aus der Praxis, den Patriotismus als eine Kategorie sozialen Zwangs zu behandeln, die bestimmte Verhaltensweisen und soziale Einstellungen im rechten politischen Diskurs aufzeigt. Es scheint, dass jede Debatte, die die Erforschung des Wesens der Idee des Patriotismus unternimmt, früher oder später in sozialen Aktivismus und offene politische Rivalität umschlagen wird. Es ist nicht verwunderlich, dass in den Strömungen populistischer politischer Philosophien Kategorien wie Patriotismus, Identität, Nationalität, Ethnizität und Nationalismus unterschiedliche semantische Dimensionen annehmen, die die sozialen Einstellungen der herrschenden Eliten beeinflussen. In diesem Aspekt kann Patriotismus als eine Form der Herrschaft der Macht über das Individuum verstanden werden, dessen Handlungen innerhalb einer sozialen Gruppe dem Willen der Mehrheit untergeordnet werden müssen. Dieser Aufsatz diskutiert die Thesen, die der zeitgenössische polnische Philosoph Jędrzej Stanisławek in seinem Artikel *Patriotismus* vorgestellt hat. Das Spektrum des streitigen Artikels betrifft die Angemessenheit der Argumentation, die das populistische Modell des Patriotismus aufrechterhält. Wir erlauben uns zu bemerken, dass das, was in diesem polemischen Artikel vorgestellt wurde, von mehreren bedeutenden Intellektuellen und Philosophen akzeptiert wird, die mit der Warschauer Schule der Philosophie der Ideen verbunden sind – wie die umstrittene Veröffentlichung von J. Stanisławek in „Edukacja Filozoficzna“ – einer der wichtigsten polnischen philosophischen Zeitschriften – belegt. Das Spektrum der Diskussion betrifft auch die Legitimität der Bekräftigung der Perspektive des Patriotismus in der Kategorie des darwinistischen Determinismus, die von J. Stanisławek präsentiert wird.

Schlüsselworte: Jędrzej Stanisławek, politische Philosophie, Moralphilosophie, Ethik, Patriotismus

Informacje o autorze:

ROBERT BOROCH, dr, Uniwersytet Warszawski; adres do korespondencji: Uniwersytet Warszawski, Wydział Lingwistyki Stosowanej, Katedra Studiów Interkulturowych Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, ul. Dobra 55, 00-312 Warszawa, e-mail: rboroch@uw.edu.pl

