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Reaching Universalism in Dialogue

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I propose to elucidate and enlarge upon Professor Janusz Kuczyński's writings on universalism via modifying the word "humanism" by adding the prefix "post" to enlarge the concept of humanism to include all present and future sentient and non-sentient life and by emphasizing the ethical thread that is the guidepost for dialogue in general and intercultural dialogue in particular. If one is to conduct a genuine dialogue, no relevant points of view should be excluded and so universalism is a necessary condition for genuine dialogue that seeks the truth, and not the better of the other in argument. Indeed, this affords us a clue to Kuczyński's subtitle of his work, *Dialogue and Universalism as a New Way of Thinking*. If one thinks of thinking as a search for truth, then genuine dialogue or in sensu stricto, polylogue is, to augment Kuczyński's notion of dialogue, the only way of thinking. Debate or eristic is not thinking. It is not a search for truth. It is an attempt to defeat the other in argument. If one is to discover the truth, then that truth must be universal.

Keywords: dialogue, polylogue, universalism, complementarity, ethical post-humanism

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Universalism cannot mean the inclusion of everything because some values contradict other values. Universalism proper, seeks to include as many equipossible particulars as possible in order that the universalism to be achieved is

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constituted by the widest possible representation. As one enters into dialogue with new interlocutors, one's universalism is constantly in the process of expansion. The universalism to be achieved is open ended. On the other hand, some particulars are in direct contradiction with each other. Hence, a choice between particulars must sometimes be made. One recalls Leibniz's idea of the "best of all possible worlds." In such a world as Leibniz points to, the world must be composed of particulars that are equipossible. Universalism is the harmonious unity of diverse positions. Universalism is not an aggregate of a collection of different points of view in a non-critical acceptance of all viewpoints. It must choose some values and abandon others. The method of the selection of what views to keep and what views to abandon is the method of seeking to forge complementary partnerships between different points of view. The proper understanding of universalism, that is the dynamic unity of complementary points of view, is the condition of proper dialogue. Universalism is the means to achieve proper dialogue.

Ethical Principles as the Criteria of Demarcation

Universalism must be guided by ethical principles. The key ethical principle is a post-humanism that includes humanism, that is, the value of the preciousness of human life, the respect for human dignity and moral equality and the preciousness of all present and future sentient and non-sentient life. Universalism selects among the manifold of existing values, which enhance the post-humanistic theme that provides the necessary unity holding the particular values together. Universalism proper is not an aggregate or collection of diverse particulars as in an eclectic potpourri of particulars. Universalism proper is unified by a post-humanistic theme that ties the particulars together with an ethical thread.

What is Proper Dialogue? The Ten Conditions

Here, I shall set forth ten conditions of my own devising, many of which I truly think can, by implication, surely be found to lie at the basis of Janusz

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Kuczyński's writings and some of which are new. These conditions largely consist of preconditions of dialogue or polylogue and require commitments on the parts of all interlocutors to the polylogue to embrace. They are, so to speak, the rules of the game.

Firstly, dialogue, which, properly speaking should be multilogue or polylogue, is not necessarily limited to interchange between two parties.² Plato's dialogues, sometimes take place between a number of interlocutors, e.g., *The Symposium* or, as it could also be fairly translated, *The Drinking Party.* Thus, dialogue could also be polylogue. In fact, true dialogue must become polylogue because otherwise it cannot be universal. In other words, no point of view, so long as it remains within post-humanistic and humanistic parameters to be discussed below, can be excluded. Plato's *Symposium* is an exemplar of polylogue as there are a number of interlocutors to the polylogue. In today's world in which we live in a global village, the concept of a polylogue is most essential.³

Secondly, dialogue, as mentioned above, is a search for truth, and is to be distinguished from *eristic*, or a debate in which each party attempts to defeat the other in argument. In order for this to occur, each interlocutor must make prior preparations for the dialogue. The prior preparations consist in making one's own point of view as universal as possible. One cannot cling to a set of unchangeable

¹ There is an earlier rendition of these ideas. However, this paper represents a revision of key concepts of that earlier version. Cf. Robert Elliot Allinson, "Dialogue in Universalism and Universalism in Dialogue," *Dialogue and Universalism* 30, no. 2 (2020): 19–33.

² Janusz Kuczyński makes indirect reference to this when he mentions parties to be included in the necessary dialogue that constitutes the construction of true universalism. For example, he writes, "in its [universalism's] axiology and normative message, universalism has to advocate the solidarity of all peoples and nations [...]." Cf. Janusz Kuczyński, *Dialogue and Universalism as A New Way of Thinking* (Warsaw: Warsaw University, 1989), 27. Janusz Kuczyński does not shy away from emphasizing a dialogue that includes Eastern as well as Western thought. He writes: "It is not accidental that in the last eight years *Studia Filozoficzne* and *Dia-lectics and Humanism* have published four issues devoted to the philosophy of India." Cf. Janusz Kuczyński, *Christian-Marxist Dialogue in Poland* (Warsaw: Interpress Publishers, 1979), 183. Janusz Kuczyński also makes reference to intellectual current in the West. For example, he refers to the "wisdom of the Enlightenment" in this same book, three pages later, on p. 186. Janusz Kuczyński 's concept of universalism included important developments in both East and West.

³ Plato's *Symposium*, unlike most of his other dialogues, is a series of monologic speeches in which each monologue makes only a brief reference to the other monologues. True polylogue would assume more of a questions and answer format.

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presuppositions as a starting point. One must already be predisposed to search for truth, not to expand one's own private interests. Before engaging in dialogue every interlocutor must be a genuine truth seeker and not a proselytizer. Truth seeking carries with it the implication that one does not already possess the truth; otherwise, one would not be a seeker.

Thirdly, in proper dialogue, one is not attached to one's own point of view and if one is shown that one's view is not sound or lacks universal humanism, one may abandon one's point of view and accept the point of view of the other.⁴ As Socrates said, he preferred to be proven wrong in argument for then he learned something. One must genuinely listen to another, which entails that one abandon one's beliefs, at least while deeply listening to the other. One should be attentive to how either the other's beliefs can be incorporated into one's own beliefs, or vice-versa. The objective is a common one. It is an attempt to seek the truth. As stated in the second condition, if one is seeking the truth, by definition, one cannot already possess the truth. One may have ideas of possible truths and arguments for those ideas, but one cannot be wedded to such ideas or arguments as intransigent axioms.

Fourthly, polylogue requires that one respond to the other's point of view. Question and answer requires both parts, question *and* response. This means that one cannot divert from answering a question or point that one's interlocutor or interlocutors states, one is duty bound in a real dialogue, to respond to the other's points. It is vital to a dialogue or polylogue not to leave the dialogue without

⁴ The notion of abandonment of one's own presuppositions in dialogue may be an augmentation of Kuczyński but it does seem to be in the spirit of his thought. Cf. Professor Michael Mitias when he writes, "However, when Kuczyński speaks of 'dialogue' he does not simply mean 'a conversation' or some kind of abstract communication between two persons, or group of persons, in which they try to understand what each party *says* or *means*, but an encounter in which the participants understand *each other*, in which they open up for each other, in which they accept each other, [...]. This is an ontological conception of dialogue, for it does not aim merely at theoretical understanding, which is an ingredient, indeed a condition, of the dialogical encounter, [how Buberian!], but at the *transformation* of attitudes and modes of conduct under the conditions of respect, freedom, mutual coexistence, and human responsibility." Michael Mitias, "Universalism and World Peace," *Dialogue and Humanism* 3, no. 1 (1993): 109. The key word here is "transformation" which I have italicized. For the other emphases, they are in the original. Plato's *Symposium* does not exhibit the ten conditions including this transformative element, but it does assume the form of a polylogue.

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offering a proper response which shows an accurate understanding of the other's point of view and arguments and makes a genuine accommodation of their position in the dialogue. Communication involves not only listening to the other, but must include a genuine response to the other. If the standpoint of the other is not clearly understood or is not agreeable, then there must be questioning of the other's standpoint. The dialogue is never complete until there is mutual understanding and mutual agreement as to the outcome of the dialogue. One can never simply agree to disagree. A dialogue or polylogue must end in some form of integration.

Fifthly, one must not enter into dialogue without a spirit of good will and openness. The meaning of this fifth presupposition of genuine dialogue is that one cannot possess a hidden (or explicit) agenda whereby one is seeking to further one's ulterior motive or agenda or where one's motive is to defeat the other in argument. The point of this fifth rule is that this is not an intellectual exercise in which one temporarily sets one's own view aside while holding it as true in order to participate in the dialogue. One must enter into the dialogue with a genuine openness and a will to succeed in the search for the truth. While certain rules cannot seemingly be set aside, such as the search for truth, we must be of good will as it requires an inner transformation to conduct a genuine dialogue and not simply rule following.

This inner transformation, as a precondition for genuine dialogue, can also be understood from the standpoint of Husserl's concept of the *epoché*. To diverge from Husserl, the transcendental Ego is not any particular ego identity, but is the pure consciousness, the presuppositionless consciousness to which no ego is attached. Such a pure consciousness is the precondition for entering into proper dialogue and is the condition for the possibility of adhering to all ten conditions. One must not ask if obtaining pure consciousness is possible. This would be akin to asking if Plato's *Republic* is possible. Possibility is not a criterion of value. At one point in the *Republic*, Plato has Socrates say that in order for the *Republic* to be achievable, one would have to commence with children under ten years old. Such a point points to the unlikelihood of the *Republic* becoming actual. Nevertheless, we must have an ideal to follow as a guidepost.

Sixthly, one must always remember that dialogue is not only between two (or more) points of view, but is also between fellow human beings. The meaning of this is that each partner to the dialogue must trust the other human being to be free of ulterior motives and not seek to dominate the other by force or power. This

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is a very important and frequently neglected rule of the game. One must attempt to see beneath the point of view the other is expressing, a genuine human attempt at communication. In other words, one must be alert to what is not being said. The explicit standpoints of the other or others may hide the positions that are being maintained beneath the spoken or written word. True dialogue requires eliciting what lies beneath the explicit points of view. This means that one must also be alert to what hidden positions lie beneath one's own explicit positions.

What is being communicated frequently if not always, is not the explicit point that is being made by oneself or the other. Looking for what is really being communicated is crucial to the success of the dialogue as a search for truth for truth hides beneath words. Genuine dialogue in some instances can be or even must be conducted in silence. One must not approach a dialogue with the presupposition that there are two or more different cultures to be differentiated, bridged, tolerated or that cannot be bridged. We cannot approach the dialogue with any conceptual or non-conceptual presuppositions. We must approach the dialogue free from assumptions. We are seeking truth and unity between humans and with nature. Truth cannot be found without unity and unity cannot be found without truth. There is always a genuine bond between humans and it is this that needs to be found and then confirmed. This also requires the extinction of any power needs. While on the surface it may appear that there are cultural or intellectual differences, it must be understood that power needs may be the real obstacle to dialogue, and not the intellectual points of difference.

Seventhly, to enlarge upon the fourth condition, we must move beyond the model of monologue to the concept of creative dialogue. Dialogue cannot be composed of dual or multiple monologic speeches, but must assume the form of a cooperative inquiry rather than an antagonistic debate in order to attempt to genuinely understand the other's point of view and *cooperate* in a mutual search for truth. As asserted in the fourth condition, we must never agree to disagree. This entirely defeats the purpose of dialogue which must be to achieve unity for there is only one truth. Individual differences must be understood as different metaphors for the same common understanding. We do not need to nor should we abandon unique metaphors or attempt to insist only upon one genuine metaphor. In a sincere way, we must let 100 flowers bloom. Every flower is a unique exemplar of Beauty. Questions and answers form the ecology of unity.

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Eighthly, to borrow from Martin Buber, dialogue must be between and I and a Thou and must not take the form of I-it communication.⁵ This eighth may be said to include all of the ten conditions or rules of dialogue, but it requires the detail provided by all of the principles to truly become activated. The I-Thou communication is both the presupposition of the methodology of dialogue and the end point of dialogue itself. The other nine conditions are the conditions for the possibility for the eighth condition, or Buber's I-Thou possible in the first place.

Ninethly, we must leave behind the tepid waters of "tolerance." For, tolerance implies a separation and one within which one remains in one's own position which one deems to be correct and the other position to be inferior and/or alien which one "tolerates". Such a division to be tolerated does not move one forward toward universalism. Plato's *Symposium* again must be called in as an illustration. In this dialogue, Socrates does not even advance his own point of view. He advances a point of view from an Other, from Diotema, his female mentor.

True universalism is obtained when each interlocutor can incorporate the methodology of the other as a means to achieve the goal of truth seeking and truth finding. No approach is to be jettisoned as inferior to another approach. Each approach, so long as it meets the standard of ethical post-humanism, is to be cherished and followed. Pluralism, just as biodiversity, is to be valued for true universalism must include the whole. Nothing that meets the ethical standards of not violating the preciousness of the preservation of sentient and non-sentient life can be left out. A complete variety of species of thought and paths to truth are required in order to achieve beauty as well as truth. Truth without beauty is not truth and beauty without truth is not beauty. Truth without beauty is not universal for beauty would be excluded and beauty without truth is not universal for truth would be excluded. The universals of truth, beauty, unity and being must all be included for if anyone of them are excluded, universality cannot be achieved.

Tenthly, we must choose the method for the proper integration of diverse points of view. The method is to employ the criteria of complementarity guided by the principle of ethical post-humanism. Here, Janusz Kuczyński provides an answer that is nearly complete; he proposes the concept of complementarity. Seeking a way in which both or many points of view can be perceived and understood as partnering with each other by finding complementary partners forms a

⁵ For some elaboration of the "I and Thou" nature of Buberian dialogue, cf. Robert Elliott Allinson, "Integrative Dialogue as a Path to Universalism: The Case of Buber and Zhuangzi," *Dialogue and Universalism* 26, no. 4 (2016): 87–104.

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crucial part of the method by which universalism is to be achieved. To Kuczyński's concept of complementarity, we add ethical post-humanism to create the complete set of criteria by which we endorse certain values and discard others.

For example, in the view of the present author, we need to discard the values of Hitler, for example, and retain the values of Gandhi. The universalism at which we aim must be renamed. We must in the future modify the concept of universalism with the adjective "post-humanistic." The universalism that excludes Hitlerism is a post-humanistic universalism. We can even use the name 'ethical post-humanism' as interchangeable with universalism.

The name "ethical humanism" may seem limited. The addition of the prefix, "post" seeks to transcend those limits. An ethical post-humanism includes the valuation of fellow creatures in the world, of the environment, of the future existence of our planet, of our future generations, of our biodiversity, of the earth and of the cosmos itself. For this small paper, I emphasize human life as an example, but the arguments given should properly apply to all sentient and non-sentient life. Hence, the larger term is "post-humanism" which includes humanism within it. The inclusion of humanism within post-humanism connotes that humanism is itself not to be abandoned but is to be transcended in order to achieve a cooperation between human beings and all sentient and non-sentient life. The holding precious of all sentient and non-sentient life is the meaning of the "post" that is added to and provides a limitation to humanism and a gateway to post-humanism. Renaissance humanism promoted the realization of the potential of the individual human being. Marxist humanism promoted the realization of the kind of society that enabled the potential of the human being to realize itself. The humanism of Jean-Paul Sartre pointed to the transcendence of the human being so that the highest potential of the human being could be actualized. Ethical post-humanism includes nature, sentient and non-sentient being and future generations and the future of the planet. Hence, ethical post-humanism expands upon the previous notions of humanism.

The universalism that is to be chosen is guided by ethical values, by values that, for example, hold that the preservation and the saving of human life, to be precious. Universalism selects among the manifold of values that exist those particular values that enhance the ethical theme that provides the necessary unity that holds the particular values together. Universalism proper is not an aggregate or collection of diverse particulars as in an eclectic potpourri of particulars.

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Universalism proper is unified by a theme that ties the particulars together with an ethical thread.

Universalism is dynamic. It is a process and rarely if ever comes to an end. It must be practiced or else values become stagnant and drift away from each other. If one lives by the principle that one may abandon one's previous point of view or one's current point of view, there never needs to be a conflict of values. Let us look more closely at the tenth condition, the unifying principle of complementarity coupled with ethical post-humanism.

What is Complementarity?

To explore what is meant by complementarity, it is best to possess recourse to the ancient Chinese concepts of Yin and Yang. Here, we introduce these fundamental concepts from Chinese philosophy to augment and further develop the ideas of Janusz Kuczyński. The Yin and the Yang have been characterized as the feminine and the masculine principle. The movement of the Yin and the Yang is cyclical. The relationship of Yin and Yang is one of partnership; it is not one of antagonism. This is very different from the concept of dialectic to be discovered to exist in the writings of Hegel, Marx and Engels. To take the Hegelian model as an exemplar of dialectic, the thesis and antithesis are in a conflictual relationship. It is out of conflict that a synthesis can be developed. However, this synthesis in turn generates more conflicts such that the process appears to be never ending and, more importantly, forever in conflict mode.

In the Hegelian model of dialectic, the thesis and the antithesis are abandoned to make way for the synthesis (though parts of each remain, or are sublated). In contrast to the Hegelian dialectic, the Yin/Yang model of partnership is one in which both points of view are maintained. There is no win-loss characterization to the meeting of the two points of view; the objective is to ensure that each point of view is not submerged, but rather that both points of view are of equal merit and what is more, each point of view requires the other point of view in order for its own standpoint to exist and flourish.

⁶ The triad nature of dialectic is a concept invented by or discovered by Fichte. Since Hegel's use of this concept has become so influential, we keep to the tradition of referring to the dynamic of thesis-antithesis-synthesis as Hegelian dialectic.

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Ethical Post-Humanism as Creating the Limits of Complementarity

The question which arises is, if proper dialogue requires the willingness, indeed, the desire to abandon one's point of view if it is shown to be inadequate, how can one, at the same time, practice complementary partnering. The answer to this question lies in the choice of values that is to be shared. For example, if one is a champion of the idea of Rights, one may adopt an antagonistic attitude toward a culture or civilization that does not seem to value the concept of individual Rights. If one adopts a proper dialogic attitude, characterized by the ten conditions, one may, upon entering into a proper dialogue, discover that the opposite civilization possesses a concept that takes the place of the concept of Rights.

Let us give these civilizations more concrete names. The West values deeply the concept of individual Rights. China values deeply the concept of Duty. In a proper dialogue, it may be discovered, through question and answer, that the West incorporated the concept of rights because it needed a concept to protect an oppressed class from the inferior treatment, the power domination of it, by the ruler, namely, the King of England. Hence, the origin of the Magna Carta. If the King had been protective of and nourishing of his subjects, the idea of Rights may never have arisen. In short, the King was not, according to the Chinese value system, acting in accordance with the genuine duties of Kingship. According to the Confucian concept of the Rectification of Names, the King was not a King. The need for a concept of Rights arose because of an absence of the concept of Duty. The relationship between the concepts of Right and Duty is asymmetrical. Duty can exist in absence of the concept of Rights. Rights cannot exist except when there is an absence of duty. The two concepts are not logical opposites with equivalent ontological existence. A complementary adjudication can demonstrate that we may include both Rights and Duties as important philosophical partners. The West can learn from the East that more attention to Duty on the part of the rulers will eliminate the problems associated with an exclusive focus on the idea of Rights. Instead of factions divided into conflictual identity groups, the proper attention to Duties will create a universalism composed of partner particulars. The East can learn from the West by focusing more on the groups who are treated without respect for their dignity and equality, that while this state of matters has emanated from the lack of attention to Duty on the part of the rulers, in light of the different historical and political conditions, change may be more likely to be produced if attention is given to the Western idea of Rights.

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Here, I would like to relate a personal story. In 1989, I was invited to join an Ethics panel of legendary philosophers held at the East-West Philosopher's Conference in Honolulu. I sat between Alasdair MacIntrye and Richard Rorty and across from me were Karl-Otto Apel, Agnes Heller and Hilary Putnam. A vigorous discussion was ongoing the theme of which was that the values of one culture should not be called upon to judge another culture. My colleague and Chairman of my Philosophy Department at the Chinese University of Hong Kong at which I was a professor, Shu-hsien Liu broke into the discussion. He brought up the example of the Tiananmen massacre and related the story to the gathered luminaries of the small statue the students possessed that gave them the inspiration and courage to stage their demonstration at the Gates of Heavenly Peace. The students called the statue the goddess of democracy. It was, in fact, a miniature statue of the Statue of Liberty. This was how the values of one culture, the West, played a crucial role when imported into the culture of the East. The assembled philosophers were stunned into a rare silence.

Can we incorporate all points of view in the interest of completing a universal whole? Particulars must be included in universalism or the universalism is empty. In Hegel's famous proclamation, "being in general is nothing in particular." The partial answer that Janusz Kuczyński gives is that we must not obliterate divergent points of view, but we must endeavor to incorporate the richness of each point of view in order to create a universal whole. Janusz Kuczyński emphasized in his writings that universalism, as he saw it, did not eliminate the richness of the particulars that constituted the whole. The whole, according to Janusz Kuczyński is *unified*. One must achieve unity such that all the particulars work together to contribute to this unity. There must be a single principle that unifies the particulars. For Kuczyński that principle is universalism.⁷ For the present author the modifying principle is the universalism that respects the preciousness of all present and future sentient and non-sentient life, that is, ethical post-humanism.

Kuczyński also plainly favors certain values over other values. In the view of the present author, one cannot simply include the values of Hitler and Gandhi together in a whole that is composed of an aggregate of the assorted values that make up our universal human history. The only answer is to choose. One must

⁷ Cf. On the cover of *Dialogue and Humanism* 2, no. 3/4 (1992), one of the sub-headings reads, "UNIVERSALISM AS A NEW PERSPECTIVE OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE SCIENCES."

choose the values of Gandhi over the values of Hitler. In this instance, the values are not complementary. Only complementary values can be chosen to constitute the universal whole. These complementary values are in turn based upon foundational value principles that are the ultimate criteria of our choice of philosophical systems or belief systems. Dialogue is the method by which we can determine if the content of philosophical systems or belief systems is complementary or antagonistic to these foundational value principles. In the case of Hitler versus Gandhi, it is plain that Hitler's plan was not universalist: certain groups, such as the Jewish people, were to be totally exterminated. For Gandhi, his plan was explicitly universalist. One of his famous sayings was, "I am a Hindu, I am a Moslem, I am a Christian and I am a Jew." A universalism that meets the standard of the ethical post-humanistic criterion of demarcation is both the means by which we choose one value system over another and the end goal of dialogue.

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Streszczenie

Uniwersalizm poprzez dialog

Proponuję rozwinięcie i poszerzenie pism Profesora Janusza Kuczyńskiego na temat uniwersalizmu polegające na modyfikacji słowa "humanizm" poprzez dodanie przedrostka "post" – by rozszerzyć pojęcie humanizmu na wszystkie obecne i przyszłe czujące i nieczujące – istoty żywe – oraz poprzez podkreślenie wątku etycznego, który jest drogowskazem dla dialogu w ogóle, a dialogu międzykulturowego w szczególności. Jeśli ma się prowadzić autentyczny

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dialog, nie można wykluczyć żadnego istotnego punktu widzenia, a zatem uniwersalizm jest warunkiem koniecznym autentycznego dialogu, który szuka prawdy, a nie przewagi nad drugim w argumentacji. W istocie, pozwala nam to odczytać druga część tytułu pracy Kuczyńskiego Dialog i uniwersalizm jako nowy sposób myślenia. Jeśli myślimy o myśleniu jako o poszukiwaniu prawdy, to prawdziwy dialog, czy też polilog sensu stricto, jest – by wzmocnić Kuczyńskiego pojęcie dialogu – jedynym sposobem myślenia. Debata czy erystyka nie są myśleniem. Nie są poszukiwaniem prawdy. Są próbą pokonania drugiego w sporze. Jeśli ma się odkryć prawdę, to prawda ta musi być uniwersalna.

Słowa kluczowe: dialog, polilog, uniwersalizm, komplementarność, etyczny posthumanizm

Zusammenfassung

Universalismus durch Dialog erreichen

Ich schlage vor, die Schriften von Professor Janusz Kuczyński über den Universalismus weiterzuentwickeln und zu erweitern, indem ich das Wort "Humanismus" durch Hinzufügen des Präfixes "Post" ändere – um den Begriff des Humanismus auf alle gegenwärtigen und zukünftigen fühlenden und nicht-empfindungsfähigen Lebewesen auszudehnen – und indem ich den ethischen Faden hervorhebe, der ein Wegweiser für den Dialog im Allgemeinen und den interkulturellen Dialog im Besonderen ist. Wenn ein echter Dialog geführt werden soll, kann kein wesentlicher Standpunkt ausgeschlossen werden, und daher ist der Universalismus eine notwendige Voraussetzung für einen authentischen Dialog, der die Wahrheit und nicht die Überlegenheit über den anderen in der Argumentation sucht. In der Tat erlaubt uns der zweite Teil des Titels von Kuczyńskis Werk *Dialog und Universalismus als eine neue Art des Denkens* dies zu erraten. Wenn wir das Denken als Suche nach der Wahrheit betrachten, dann ist ein wahrer Dialog oder Polylog sensu stricto – um Kuczyńskis Begriff des Dialogs zu stärken – die einzige Art zu denken. Debatte oder Eristik sind kein Denken. Sie sind keine Suche nach der Wahrheit. Sie sind ein Versuch, den anderen in einem Streit zu besiegen. Wenn die Wahrheit entdeckt werden soll, muss diese Wahrheit universell sein.

Schlüsselwörter: Dialog, Polylog, Universalismus, Komplementarität, ethischer Posthumanismus

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