The Veridical Experience and the Indefeasible Reasons in John McDowell’s Epistemological Disjunctivism

Michał Bochen

Abstract


McDowell’s epistemological disjunctivism is based on the thesis that veridical and non-veridical experiences have a different epistemic status. Some veridical experiences may be a case of the manifestation that x is F ― McDowell believes that in such a case, the subject has an indefeasible reason for believing that x is F takes place. In the critical part of the article, I show that experience understood in this way cannot provide the subject with an indefeasible reason, since the identification of experience as the case of the manifestation that F is x, is a fallible ability. In the last part of the article, I show that we can accept the concept of perceptual justification without the need to accept the idea of the indefeasibility of reasons.


Keywords


John McDowell; disjunctivism; perception; epistemology; veridical experience

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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.17951/kw.2022.34.183-207
Date of publication: 2023-02-14 12:07:23
Date of submission: 2022-04-25 13:10:20


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