On non-existence and normativity of values

Abstract

The main purpose of the paper is to prove that values do not belong to the concept of being and  that they are  obligatorily attached to the subject, even though they do not exist objectively. The author censures the ontology of value. Presented are arguments in support of positive theses that: (1) valuable objects are subjects of correct feelings; (2) lack of inconsistency between the substance of feelings and the subject’s happiness as indicated by self-knowledge and  reason, evidences correctness of feelings; (3) the content of happiness, affirmed by free decision (pre-decision) represents the content of the first axiological premise in practical reasoning; (4) it is human desire of being the subject affirming one's own freedom and rationality that represents the source of normativity of values. The axiological position proposed by the author is  placed between  two censured extremes, that is objectivist ontology of values and subjectivistic emotivism.