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Roman Ingarden's Theory of the Literary Work of Art: A Cognitive Grammar Reassessment

ABSTRACT

Based on Langacker's conception of *grouping*, the paper reformulates the basic assumptions of Ingarden's theory of the literary work of art in terms of the Cognitive Grammar approach. The claim is made that, given a gestalt-based approach to the multi-stratal nature of the literary work as envisioned by Ingarden, the idea of grouping is a perfect methodological tool to apply in a holistic analysis as developed within *cognitive poetics* (*sensu* Stockwell). An incremental cognitive process, grouping "transcends" – in a gestalt-like fashion – all "levels" of conceptual organization. For illustrative purposes, the paper recasts Ingarden's analysis of Mickiewicz's "The Ackerman Steppe" in terms of Cognitive Grammar.

Keywords: literary work of art, phenomenological analysis, cognitive grammar, places of indeterminacy, grouping

1. Introduction

This paper makes an attempt to provide a cognitive poetics perspective on Roman Ingarden's phenomenological analysis of the literature reading process based on Ronald Langacker's conception of *grouping* – an incremental cognitive process which holds across all levels of conceptual organization. We believe that Ingarden's intellectual legacy has not lost its originality today, its currency and appeal. His works have proved inspirational for many contemporary scholars who appreciate the adaptability of Ingarden's theory to the demands of our times, acknowledging its applicability not only to philosophy and literature but also to many fields of artistic expression. In Section 2 we present Ingarden's theory of the literary work of art. Section 3 offers a brief presentation of Langacker's theory of grouping. The conception of grouping combined with Gilles Fauconnier and Mark

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Turner's (2002) conceptual integration theory will be applied in Section 4 to our re-analysis of Ingarden's conception of the *places of indeterminacy* emerging in Adam Mickiewicz's poem "The Ackerman Steppe."

2. Ingarden's theory of the literary work of art

According to Ingarden (1973a, 1973b), literary works of art are *intentional* objects which enter with the cognising subject (in this case, the reader) into a *transcendental relationship*. This relationship presupposes the immersion of the reader in a literary work's fictional world and their adoption of an *empathetic stance* vis-à-vis the events, characters, things, locations, etc. as portrayed in that world. The term *intentionality* is defined by *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* as follows:

In philosophy, intentionality is the power of minds and mental states to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs. To say of an individual's mental states that they have intentionality is to say that they are mental representations or that they have contents. [...] [T]he meaning of the word 'intentionality' should not be confused with the ordinary meaning of the word 'intention.' As indicated by the meaning of the Latin word *tendere*, which is the etymology of 'intentionality,' the relevant idea behind intentionality is that of mental directedness towards (or attending to) objects, as if the mind were construed as a mental bow whose arrows could be properly aimed at different targets. (Pierre 2019)

Works of fiction such as a literary work of art are intentional because they presuppose the subject's/reader's "mental directness" towards them; literary works are "about something" – about things to which the "mind as a mental bow" aims in its *intentional acts*.

According to Edmund Husserl, there is an intimate relationship between consciousness and perception. A perceived object may, but need not exist in reality. Nor does it need to be unequivocally recognized, so to speak, as is the case, for instance, with Wittgenstein's famous Duck-Rabbit figure. What is important in this case is that "the correlate of an act of perception [or its meaning or appearance]" – the perceived duck or the perceived rabbit – "is the perceived object exactly as it is being perceived, i.e. [according to Husserl], as a perceptual noema" (Chojna, 2018, p. 7). This means that in the case of the duck-rabbit figure, during the act of perception of this hybrid category, the same sensory data can appear in our consciousness (or are interpreted) as a rabbit noema or a duck noema.

All these appearances of the duck-rabbit figure as perceived from different perspectives form a *set of noemas*, called by Husserl *noemata*, i.e. an open-ended *gestalt* of a particular thing or category as perceived (and experienced). The act of perception which leads to the emergence (or, in Husserl's parlance, *constitution*) in our consciousness, of a noema, or a set of noemas (*noemata*), is referred to as *noesis*.

Noesis is a ubiquitous process; it affects all spheres of human experience, including the human experience of objects of culture such as literary works of art

written by particular authors and read by their readers. Thus, in some sense, Mrs Dalloway is an object: it is a book with written pages, containing sentences, paragraphs, chapters, etc.; in some other sense, however, it is not: it is neither a solid object nor an idealistic, "purely imagined" entity. It is, in Ingarden's parlance, a purely intentional object. As such, in contrast to solid objects like chairs or tables, a purely intentional object such as a literary work contains places of indeterminacy, to be filled by the reader during the reading process. While filling the places of indeterminacy, the reader experiences the aesthetic quality of a given literary work.

But what exactly is the nature of the purely intentional object of the literary work which gives rise to the aesthetic experience of the reader? According to Ingarden, a literary work of art has a multi-stratal structure. It consists of four strata:

- (1) the stratum of *word sounds* and the *phonetic formations* of higher order built on them;
- (2) the stratum of *meaning units* of various orders;
- (3) the stratum of manifold schematized *aspects* and aspect continua and series [...];
- (4) the stratum of *represented objectivities* and their vicissitudes (1973b, p. 30)¹.

Each stratum is characterized as being to some extent *indeterminate* or *schematic* (as all *gestalts* are), achieving, during the aesthetic experience of the reading process, its full realization or *concretization*. The emergent *polyphonic* correlate of this experience becomes an *aesthetic object*, with the material properties of each of its stratum leading "to the constitution of its own aesthetic characters, which correspond to the nature of the material" (Ingarden 1973b, p. 58).

Consider first the stratum of *word sounds* and *phonetic formations*. This stratum is naturally connected with meaning; it is the carrier of meaning². Associated with this stratum is, for instance, the melodic quality of the language used by the author in the process of constitution of the literary work's meaning. The sound of the word, says Ingarden:

can [...] contain qualities that are aesthetically relevant. Thus one often distinguishes, e.g., "beautiful" and "ugly" sounding words (or, more precisely, word sounds). There are, in addition, "light" and "heavy" words, words which sound "funny" or "serious," or "solemn" or "pathetic," and those which are "simple" and "straightforward." (p. 45)

Certainly, not only words themselves but also the sounds of units larger than words – phrases and sentences which are associated with the melodic qualities of the text: rhythm and tempo – markedly contribute to the aesthetic qualities of the

¹ Elsewhere, Ingarden (1947/2000, p. 36) admits the possibility of a literary work having more than four strata.

² This is clearly an echo of the Saussurean *dictum* that the signifier and the signified form an indissoluble whole.

literary text. They carry the so-called “‘emotional’ or ‘mood’ qualities [such as]: ‘sad,’ ‘melancholy,’ ‘merry,’ ‘powerful,’ etc.” (Ingarden, 1973b, p. 52).

The polyphonic character of the literary work of art manifests itself further at its next stratum, namely the stratum of *meaning units* consisting, inter alia, of affirmative sentences which, in a literary work, in contradistinction to declarative sentences of a scientific work, are *quasi judgements*. In Ingarden’s own words,

[i]f we were to compare the declarative sentences [affirmative propositions] appearing in a literary work with, for example, those of a scientific work, we would immediately observe that, despite the same form and despite at times also a seemingly identical content, they are essentially different: those appearing in a scientific work are genuine *judgments* in a logical sense, in which something is seriously asserted and which not only lay claim to truth but *are* true or false, while those appearing in a literary work are not pure affirmative propositions, nor, on the other hand, can they be considered to be seriously intended assertive propositions or judgments. (1973b, p. 160)

Let us note that the theory of quasi judgements accounts for what contemporary literary theorists call the “make believe” of a world of fiction – a distance on the part of the reader vis-à-vis the represented world. Without assuming this distance, Wojciech Chojna (2018) notes, “we could mistake art for reality, as those naïve spectators who rushed on to a stage to help a heroine in danger” (p. 106).

This brings us to the third stratum of the literary work – the stratum of *represented objectivities* and their vicissitudes, or simply: the stratum of *presented objects*. For Ingarden (1973b), this is the most important stratum of a literary work, a stratum which

appears to exist within the literary work solely for itself; and it is thus not only the most important element, the focal point of the literary work of art, for the constitution of which all the other elements exist, but it appears to be something which has no other function than simply to be. In fact, in reading a work, our attention is likewise directed primarily at represented objectivities. (p. 288)

Commenting on the passage, Chojna (2018) observes that these words may sound “strange [...], especially from someone who always protested against reducing the complex structure of a literary work of art to one stratum only, not only in the philosophical analysis but also in the aesthetic perception” (p. 97). They should, however, be viewed as an attempt on Ingarden’s part to show that all the other elements of a literary work “exist in order to culminate at the stratum of objectivities” (p. 98). Indeed, each stratum of a literary work, Chojna goes on to say, “possesses certain aesthetic qualities which enhance an aesthetic experience, and contribute to the constitution of a valuable aesthetic object” (p. 98). This aesthetic object, Chojna concludes, “is not only the end of every successful aesthetic experience, but the *telos* of every literary work of art, the only way of being of a literary work as a work of art” (p. 98).

The culmination, as it were, of the aesthetic quality of a literary work of art takes place at the level of the fourth stratum – the stratum of schematised aspects,

a stratum closely linked with the perspectival nature of our perception. It will be recalled that, when introducing the basic idea of places of indeterminacy, we stated that the perception of a literary work of art presupposes the existence of a schematic structure containing the places of indeterminacy, the filling of which yields an aesthetically valued noetic structure of the literary work. But how exactly is the overall aesthetic gestalt structure of a literary work of art constituted? Is it not necessary, Ingarden asks, “to distinguish yet another special stratum of the literary work, one which would, so to speak, ‘cut across’ the above-mentioned strata and have the foundation of its constitution in them – a stratum of aesthetic value qualities and the polyphony that is constituted in them” (Ingarden, 1973b, p. 31)? The answer to this question can be found in the last chapter of Ingarden’s *Literary Work of Art*, in the section titled “The literary work of art and the polyphonic harmony of its aesthetic value qualities.” Says Ingarden:

In the course of our analyses we have frequently referred to the value qualities that are constituted in the individual strata of the literary work and that in their totality bring about a polyphonic harmony. The polyphonic harmony is precisely that “side” of the literary work that, along with the metaphysical qualities attaining manifestation, makes the work a *work of art*. (p. 369)

The polyphonic harmony, then, is the result of the close *interconnections* of the literary work’s strata, which through the active participation of the reader, conspire to produce the gestaltic aesthetic effect. Seen in linguistic terms, this means that a literary work’s *form*, or its *structure*, constitutes an indissociable whole with its *meaning*, or *function*. The question now is how to formally account for the structure-function indissociability. This could be done, we will contend, in the framework of Langacker’s latest version of Cognitive Grammar (2016), which we will call here the *Cognitive Grammar Structure and Function* model (CGSF-model).

3. Structure and function in Cognitive Grammar: Langacker’s conception of grouping

For Langacker (2016), structure and function are “indissociable, like the two sides of a coin,” and “a structure is never independent of its functions” (p. 24). This is not a widely accepted view, though. On the contrary, structure, Langacker notes, “is often identified with grammar, and function with meaning. Or structure with lexicon, morphology, syntax, and phonology, and function with things like semantics, pragmatics, and discourse functions” (p. 16). The structure/function distinction, however,

is a kind of disguised metaphor. It’s a manifestation of the substance/activity distinction which [...] is ultimately wrong [...] The formal elements are substantive only metaphorically. Phonological, lexical, and grammatical structures consist in patterns of processing activity, just as meanings do. (pp. 16–17)

Yet the patterns of processing activity are relatively *stable*, owing to their entrenchment and their ability to reappear. An *established processing routine* (or *unit*), created through entrenchment, “decomposes into subpatterns – *parts* within the *whole* [...] [which] are connected in various ways: via association, temporal sequencing, partial overlap,” giving rise to the “structure’s configuration” (p. 17, italics in original). Seen in this light, the structure-function relation is, according to Langacker, “just a matter of perspective” (p. 17). In an attempt to describe structures at all levels of conceptual organization, Langacker notes, we thus “are implicitly describing [their] functions: we’re describing lower-level structures, and we’re describing how they map onto aspects of higher-level structures, and this amounts to characterizing the functions” (p. 17).

But what is a *structure*, then? For Langacker, a structure is a configuration in which the elements from which it is composed are linked to each other by means of the following three types of connections:

- 1) overlap in the activity comprising the connected elements;
- 2) association, such that one structure tends to activate another;
- 3) operations (e.g. comparison, categorization, assessment of relative position in some field). (2016, p. 20) field)

It should be stressed that the same elements can be connected in many different ways to produce different structures that can be further *augmented* by other elements and/or connections. According to Langacker,

- 1) connection produces a new entity representing a higher-level of organization;
- 2) the higher-level entity has emergent properties, minimally including the nature of the connections and any adjustments the component elements undergo;
- 3) a component of a higher-level entity may participate individually in further connections;
- 4) a higher-level entity (being a structure in its own right) can also participate as a whole in further connections. This is so when the connections depend on emergent properties;
- 5) when this happens at successive levels of organization, the result is hierarchy. (Langacker, 2016, p. 21)

Let us add that the concept of connection can apply to an analysis of a literary text as well. For example, in a sonnet, individual lines combine to form a stanza, i.e. a higher-level entity (cf. 1). Stanzas, in turn, compose the octave and the sestet as constitutive parts of the sonnet (cf. 2). Again, the octave, consisting of two quatrains, is a higher-level entity in relation to them (cf. 3). In this way a hierarchy of successive levels is established within the poem (cf. 4).

Returning to Langacker’s thread of argumentation, when the potential of a higher-order entity created by connected elements to function in some other higher-level structure is realized, a *grouping* emerges. In it “[t]he elements are

grouped into what counts as one entity for this higher-level purpose” (p. 23). The process of grouping can be presented as follows:




Figure 1: Grouping (Langacker, 2016, p. 23)

All expressions, compound or simplex alike, form a *system*: “the set of elements that fulfill a certain function” (Langacker, 2016, p. 28). These elements, called by Langacker *exponents* or *members* of the system, are *mutually exclusive*; they are “in opposition to one another. In neural terms, they are connected by *inhibitory* (rather than *excitatory*) links” (p. 28, italics in original).

The function/schema-related categorizing relationship can be presented as follows:




Figure 2: The function/schema-related categorizing relationship (Langacker, 2016, p. 29)

In Figure 2, according to Langacker (2016),

F is some function, and a, b, and c are its exponents; they constitute a system of elements that serve the function. [...] [T]he exponents of the system are mutually inhibitory. If you activate one, it tends to suppress the others. That’s the basis for the notion of *opposition* – they’re opposed to one another, which is actually an aspect of their value. [...] It’s very commonly the case that, if we take the elements that serve a certain function, they instantiate some schema.

So in [...] (b) there is categorization. [V] is what [i], [a], and [u] have in common – the notion of a vowel, without being specific about which particular vowel it is. [i], [a], and [u] are instantiations of this schema. (pp. 28–29)

In order to incorporate these observations into the Cognitive Grammar model, we have to introduce now two notions: *baseline* and *elaboration*. In Langacker’s parlance,

- 1) The terms *baseline* and *elaboration* indicate both *priority* and a difference in *complexity*.
- 2) Canonically there are three structures exhibiting definite asymmetries: B is *prior* to E (hence to BE); B is more *substantive* than E; BE is more *complex* than B (or E).
- 3) B/E organization represents a kind of *layering* (arrangement in terms of *core* and *periphery*). The layers are referred to as strata (S).
- 4) Each stratum (S_i) is a substrate for the next (S_{i+1}), providing the basis for its emergence. S_{i+1} elaborates S_i by invoking *additional resources* allowing a *wider array of alternatives*. (2016, p. 41)

The layering of strata via the elaboration process and the different ways of elaborating a baseline stratum can be presented as follows:




Figure 3: Strata layering and elaboration (Langacker, 2016, p. 45)

Accordingly, in the chain of elaborations above, “B is elaborated by E₁ to yield BE₁, then that as a whole is elaborated by E₂, resulting in BE₁E₂. So there are three strata” (Langacker 2016, p. 45).

It is precisely the chain of elaborations provided by the grouping process that can be evoked here to account for and thus give substance to Ingarden’s claim about the “polyphonic interconnectedness” of the literary work’s strata. This move is not at all unwarranted, given the striking parallels between Ingarden’s and Langacker’s theoretical proposals. First, both Ingarden and Langacker speak of “strata,” albeit differently understood. Second, both scholars embrace the idea of a gestalt-based form of categorization. For Ingarden (1973b), “the value qualities [...] in the individual strata of the literary work [...] in their totality bring about a polyphonic harmony” (p. 369), while for Langacker (2016), “structure and function, [...], are indissociable” and “a structure is never independent of its functions” (p. 24). Third, both Ingarden and Langacker speak of “category change” leading to the emergence of a new quality. Thus, Ingarden speaks of the changes in the appearances of the people

and things presented caused by the transition from one phase of a literary work into another, while Langacker – of the baseline and elaboration-related process in which “each stratum (S_i) is a substrate for the next (S_{i+1}), providing the basis for its emergence” (p. 41). Finally, both Ingarden and Langacker assume the existence of some “more basic stratum.” However, while for Ingarden, the basic, the “most important stratum,” is the stratum of presented objects/objectivities, for Langacker, the “basic stratum,” or the baseline, is a prototype-based norm, “from which other variants develop by extension, specialization, or schematization” (p. 36).

This brings us to a CGSF-based analysis of “The Ackerman Steppe,” initially proposed, in phenomenological terms, by Ingarden himself. We will concentrate here mainly only on two strata: the stratum of represented objects and the stratum of manifold schematized aspects.

4. Analysis of “The Ackerman Steppe”

Let us begin with Ingarden’s own analysis of Mickiewicz’s poem “The Ackerman Steppe” [Stepy Akermańskie], developed by him in his book *Szkice z filozofii literatury* (Ingarden 1947/2000). The original Polish poem (Mickiewicz, n.d.) and its English translation by Edna Worthley Underwood (Mickiewicz, 1917) are given below.

Wpłynąłem na suchego przestwór oceanu, Wóz nurza się w zieloność i jak łódka brodzi, Śród fali łąk szumiących, śród kwiatów powo- dzi, Omijam koralowe ostrowy burzanu.	Across sea-meadows measureless I go, My wagon sinking under grass so tall The flowery petals in foam on me fall, And blossom-isles float by I do not know.
Już mrok zapada, nigdzie drogi ni kurhanu; Patrzę w niebo, gwiazd szukam przewodniczek łodzi; Tam z dała błyszczący obłok? tam jutrzeńca wschodzi? To błyszczący Dniestr, to weszła lampa Akermanu.	No pathway can the deepening twilight show; I seek the beckoning stars which sailors call, And watch the clouds. What lies there brightening all? The Dneister’s, the steppe-ocean’s evening glow!
Stójmy! — Jak cicho! — Słyszę ciągnące żurawie, Których by nie dościgiły źrenice sokoła;	The silence! I can hear far flight of cranes — So far the eyes of eagle could not reach —
Słyszę, kędy się motyl kołysa na trawie, Kędy wąż śliską piersią dotyka się ziola.	And bees and blossoms speaking each to each; The serpent slipping adown grassy lanes;
W takiej ciszy — tak ucho natężam ciekawie, Że słyszałbym głos z Litwy. — Jedźmy, nikt nie woła!	From my far home if word could come to me! — Yet none will come. On, o’er the meadow-sea!

Ingarden starts his analysis by noting first that the literary work of art has a *dual* nature. For him, it is precisely this *duality* of a literary work of art that distinguishes a literary work from any other work of art, such as, for example, a painting. Thus, on the one hand, the literary work's structure is characterized by its linearity: we start reading "The Ackerman Steppe" word after word, line after line, combining sentences into larger portions of the text, till we reach the final line "Jedźmy, nikt nie woła!" ("On, o'er the meadow-sea!"). We can speak here of the *phases* of a literary text's structure, with one phase leading to the constitution of a higher-order structure. On the other hand, these larger portions of the text, built from sentences, are associated with the four different *strata*, already discussed above.

When moving from one phase-related structure of a literary work to another, higher-order structure, Ingarden notes, we can see that the higher-order structures very often exhibit new qualities. For example, the sounds of words (the stratum of word sounds) in a poem, arranged in a particular order, are combined into verses, e.g., in Mickiewicz's sonnet, "Wpłynąłem na suchego przestwór oceanu" ("Across sea-meadows measureless I go"), or "Patrzę w niebo, gwiazd szukam przewodniczek łodzi" ("I seek the beckoning stars which sailors call") (Ingarden, 1947/2000, p. 23). The poem's lines, in turn, form stanzas, which, when we "move along" to another phase, form a higher-order text unit, in this case – the sonnet. Consisting of word sounds, higher-order structures of this sort involve, according to Ingarden, such *phenomena* ("zjawiska") as rhythm, rhyme, and melody. Those sound-related phenomena accompany, as it were, the whole of the literary work of art.

Not only word sounds and their combinations are associated with (aesthetically marked) phenomena (e.g. with rhyme and melody), but the meaning units and their higher-order structures, such as phrases and sentences, are accompanied by appropriate phenomena as well. Thus, as Ingarden observes, the sentence "Wóz nurza się w zieloność i jak łódka brodzi" ("My wagon sinking under grass so tall") is composed of individual words. However, a sentence of this kind does not "stand alone"; it forms with other sentences super-ordinate structures, such as stanzas.

Turning to the stratum of represented objectivities, or the represented world, Ingarden notes that the words and sentences describe not only the things and people appearing in the poem but also the various relations between them and the processes and states in which they participate or appear (1947/2000, p. 25). All of these conspire to form a uniform whole. Take the first four lines of the poem. These lines (which form a stanza in the Polish original), Ingarden says, delineate not only "measureless sea-meadows" ("suchego przestwór oceanu") i.e. "steppe" ("step"), the wagon which is sliding – like a boat over the waves – over the meadows, but also somebody who is sitting on the wagon, which, while moving along the steppe, "sinks under grass so tall" ("nurza się w zieloność"). All this, Ingarden observes, forms one coherent whole: an image. Seen through the stratum of repre-

sented objectivities, the things presented in the poem and their arrangement make it possible for us to easily grasp the whole scene.

Yet, this whole delineated by the first stanza does not exhaust everything the poem speaks about (Ingarden, 1947/2000, p. 25), but changes in accordance with the new details provided in the next phase. In particular, “the deepening twilight” (“mrok zapada”) and the steppe, all covered with grass, disclose “no pathway” (p. 26). New things appear owing to the conjectured look of the speaker, implied in rhetorical questions: the sky over the steppe, the moon rising, the Dniester glowing. In Ingarden’s own words:

The “landscape” of the first stanza turns into a slightly different landscape of the second stanza, becoming a background for what is dwelt on in the following part of the poem – the background from which new details can be singled out (the silence, the flight of cranes), but which, at the same time, becomes merely a background, while what is foregrounded is an individual living in this world. And now, an outburst of quivering emotion (not named, though) explodes in the words: “Jedźmy! nikt nie woła” [lit. “Let’s go, nobody’s calling!”]; the words which directly refer to the represented world. In this way, among the events taking place in the represented world, an important event occurs, the finale and the axis of all. Yet, the environment does not disappear; on the contrary, it constitutes the foundation of the event and its harmonic complementation. (Ingarden, 1947/2000, p. 26, translation ours)

Turning to the stratum of schematized aspects in “The Ackerman Steppe,” Ingarden claims that the world presented in the poem not only *exists*, but also appears to the reader through the schematized aspects (or the appearances) of the people and things presented. In contrast to the three strata of the literary work just discussed, the appearances, Ingarden observes, do not form a continuum which complements each phase of the literary work in the process of its reading; rather, the appearances, along with each transition to the next phase of reading, “sparkle” from time to time, “light up, go out and light up again” (Ingarden, 1947/2000 p. 28). The appearances are “actualized” by the reader during the reading process; they are “in the readiness, in the state of certain potentiality” (p. 28). They can belong to different senses, they can even be extra-sensory; yet, they can still be “visible phenomena of that which is psychic” (p. 28). Thus, in “The Ackerman Steppe,” we see first the “measureless see-meadow” steppe and then, against this background, the “flowery petals in foam / [...] And blossom-isles float[ing] by,” over the periphery of the whole scene. Then the next visual scene unfolds before the reader’s eyes: the darkening sky, “the beckoning stars,” and “the Dneister’s [...] evening glow.”

Interestingly, in the second part of the sonnet, the visual appearance of the scene gives way to the *aural appearance* of the profound silence, brought to the fore by the practically inaudible “far flight of cranes” or “bees and blossoms speaking each to each” (“kędy się motyl kołysa” – lit. “where the butterfly is swaying”). Also, let us add here, the visual appearance of the scene gives way to yet another appearance: the appearance of the sense of *touch*, perceived especially in the Polish line “Kędy

wąż śliską piersią *dotyka się* [touches] ziola” (“The serpent slipping adown grassy lanes”). This appearance, in its part, contributes to the effect of silence, too.

The transition from visual to aural (and to tactile) appearance, Ingarden observes,

is perfectly justified by the scene of the dusk falling. From an artistic point of view, this transition becomes the background for the outburst of feeling, which, owing to the fact that it is expressed only in the verbal behaviour of the speaking subject, is *visually* imposed on the reader in the form of the moving overpowering emotion. The sensory appearances change into the extra-sensory “appearance” [...] of vivid emotion. (Ingarden, 1947/2000, p. 28, translation ours)

The “appearance of the vivid emotion,” then, experienced by the reader, is the result of the interplay of the different elements of the sonnet, of its dual character on the level of language and on the level of the image of the world, culminating in the words: “On, over the meadow-seal!” (“Jedźmy, nikt nie woła!”) (p. 29), which define the experience of the overwhelming silence of the steppe. In this way, Ingarden concludes, “the multi-layered structure of the literary work and the order of occurrence of the phases each one after another [...] are firmly related and cannot be separated” (p. 29). With this in mind we can now recast Ingarden’s analysis in terms of the CGSF-model.

Our analysis of the strata of represented objects and schematized aspects in “The Ackerman Steppe” is based on the following claims: (i) the grouping processes apply “vertically,” cutting across the different levels of conceptual organization; (ii) the bi-polar linguistic units constitute the baseline in the literary work (including the baseline of Mickiewicz’s poem); (iii) the semantic poles of these units are associated with their conceptual structure: with the events these units describe and with the construal operations such as metaphor, metonymy and blending building the conceptual system³; and (iv) Ingarden’s places of indeterminacy should be redefined in terms of the emergent information in the blending space of the conceptual integration process.

With respect to (i), the best way to describe the “cutting-across” nature of the grouping process, is to evoke an image of a multilayered cake with the cross-section’s emergent structure organized by the process. Commenting on the so-called *generalization commitment* of cognitive linguistics, Evans, Bergen, and Zinken (2007) note that

cognitive linguistic approaches often take a ‘vertical’, rather than a ‘horizontal’ approach to the study of language. Language can be seen as composed of a set of distinct layers of organization – the sound structure, the set of words composed by these sounds, the syntactic structures these words are constitutive of, and so on. If we array these layers one on top of the next as they unroll over time (like layers of a cake), then modular approaches are horizontal, in the sense that they take one layer and study it internally – just as a *horizontal slice of cake*. Vertical approaches get a richer view of language by taking a *vertical slice of language* [emphasis added], which

³ For a list and the discussion of construal operations, see, for example, Kövecses (2015, p. 17).

includes phonology, morphology, syntax, and of course a healthy dollop of semantics on top. A vertical slice of language is necessarily more complex in some ways than a horizontal one – it is more varied and textured – but at the same time it affords possible explanations that are simply unavailable from a horizontal, modular perspective. (p. 4)

Certainly, by “offering a vertical slice of language” the grouping process is an ideal tool to account for the intra-stratal nature of the Ingardenian literary work.

In regard to (ii), we assume that the baseline of the grouping process in the case of a literary work such as “The Ackerman Steppe” consists of a succession of linguistic units followed by the reader in the processing time⁴. (This corresponds to Ingarden’s phase-related structure of a literary work followed by the reader during the reading process.) In Cognitive Grammar, linguistic units are bi-polar, consisting of the Phonological Pole [P], and the Semantic Pole [S]. Seen from this perspective, the linguistic units representing the first two sentences in “The Ackerman Steppe” might look as follows (capital letters represent the semantic pole of the sentence, while small letters, the phonological pole):




Figure 4: Processing of linguistic units (sentences)

Figure 4 depicts the processing involving the first two lines in “The Ackerman Steppe”, with the processing taking place sequentially: first sentence [1] is processed, then, the compound sentence consisting of two coordinate sentences, [2] and [3], are analyzed.

Turning to (iii), it is little wonder why Ingarden takes the stratum of the represented objects to be the most important layer of the literary work of art. Indeed, when reading a literary work, we inevitably ask: What is the work about? What are its characters? What relations obtain between them? Where does the action

⁴ Langacker draws a distinction between the so-called *processing time*, i.e. the time during which cognitive abilities, such as, say, reading, take place, and *conceived time*, which is part of a given conceptualization – a *process* which is coded by a given verb.

take place?, etc. In short, we enquire about *events* – understood as the *situations* in which the *participants* (or literary characters) are found, the *activities* (or *processes*) they are engaged in and the *circumstances* (the *setting*) in which the situation develops. In a sentence, participants are usually coded as nouns, processes as verbs, and circumstances, as adjuncts. For our cognitive characterization of an event, we propose the so-called *Schematic Event Model* (SEM), based on Langacker’s conception of the *Canonical Event Model* (Langacker, 1991, pp. 285–286), the latter representing, in Langacker’s parlance, “the normal observation of a prototypical action” (p. 286). The SEM model and the Canonical Event Model are given in Figure 5a and 5b, respectively.




Figure 5: The SEM Model and the Canonical Event Model

As shown in Figure 5b, Langacker’s Canonical Event Model contains participants – prototypically, an Agent (AG) and Patient (PAT), who function in a *setting*, a kind of scene, which is overlooked by a viewer (V). SEM, in turn, is our *schematic* representation (without role specification) of an event, adapted for the purpose of exposition (see below).

Now, since the three sentences represent the respective events, involving the verbs *wpłynąć* ‘lit. sail in’, *nurzać się* ‘sink’ and *brodzić* ‘lit. paddle/wade’, respectively, the events can be said to be elaborations of these baseline structures at a higher strata-level. The process of elaboration may be schematically presented as follows. The lower boxes represent the baseline – the bi-polar linguistic units, which are elaborated at their semantic poles⁵ by the schematic event models – the elaborations in S_1 .

Finally, turning to (iv), i.e. to Ingarden’s places of indeterminacy, we claim that the places of indeterminacy can be seen to be directly linked to the new, emergent information in the blend of the conceptual integration process. The “basic diagram” of the conceptual integration process, shown in Figure 7, is well-known:

⁵ For the purpose of exposition the semantic pole of these units is placed below, not above the phonological pole.




Figure 6: The baseline/the semantic poles of linguistic units elaborated by the event models




Figure 7: Conceptual integration (cf. Fauconnier & Turner, 2002, p. 46)

The conceptual integration process involves four mental spaces: the generic space (very often omitted in actual linguistic practice), at least two so-called input spaces, and the so-called blend. Crucial in the case of the latter is new, emergent information that does not appear in either the generic space or in the input spaces. And this is exactly the nature of a place of indeterminacy: the information is “not there,” it is not readily given; it *emerges* as a result of the reader’s attempt to fill in the literary work’s schematic structure with context-governed information. We argue that looked at from this perspective, places of indeterminacy in a literary work (such as Mickiewicz’s sonnet) can

be conceived of in terms of blends: it is precisely in the blends that the “missing information,” indispensable for a possible range of interpretations of the poem, emerges.⁶

But what are those blends in Mickiewicz’s sonnet? A close look at the poem indicates that it is its first two lines (the first three sentences), just cited, that are essential to our understanding and interpretation of the whole poem. These lines juxtapose, in metaphorical/conceptual integration terms, two conceptualizations: the concept of “steppe” and the concept of “ocean.” The resulting blend “step-ocean,” which is clearly seen in the English translation, “sea-meadow,” is the new, emerging structure – an Ingardenian place of indeterminacy – which can now “expand,” depending on the reader’s interpretive skills, their knowledge of the sonnet convention, of the sonnet’s literary critique, etc. The place of indeterminacy in this case, associated with the blending process, which elaborates further the structures in Figure 7, can be schematically shown as follows:




Figure 8: The elaborations and the “places of indeterminacy” in “The Ackerman Steppe”

⁶ We thus assume a “default-value” approach to the role and function of blends. Whereas for Fauconnier and Turner, the blend *contains* new information (or more appropriately: the new information *emerges* in the blend), we claim that the whole blend *is* emergent information, which *also* contains elements recruited from the input spaces and the generic space.

5. Conclusion

Figure 8 represents just a small fraction of what a Cognitive Grammar analysis of Mickiewicz's sonnet based on Ingarden's insights may look like. Due to the limited scope of the paper, we have taken into account here only the strata of *represented objectivities* and *schematized aspects*. We hope to have shown that the conception of grouping combined with the idea of conceptual blending is a promising methodological tool in explaining the mechanism of completion of places of indeterminacy. Further research is needed though on the strata of *word sounds* and *phonetic formations*, which play a very important, often defining role in interpretations of a poem. Yet another issue related to Ingarden's places of indeterminacy, not discussed here, is that of the *aesthetic qualities* of a literary work of art. Nor have we addressed the issue of literary tradition and genre that play an important role in literary analysis. We do believe though that these issues can be handled in a principled way by Ronald Langacker's theory of Cognitive Grammar. Generally, it is our conviction that cognitive linguistics, and Cognitive Grammar in particular, can be successfully applied in cognitive-poetic study of literary texts, drawing on the valuable insights of "old" literary theories like Ingarden's, embedding them in the modern literary discourse.

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