Good Cooperation Between the Debtor of the Seized Receivable with the Enforcement Authority and the Creditor as a Condition for the Effectiveness of Administrative Enforcement

Abstract

This article discusses issues related to implementing the principle of cooperation between the debtor of the seized receivable, the enforcement authority, and the creditor into administrative enforcement procedures, as well as the impact of this principle on the effectiveness of enforcement. The dominant objective of this cooperation is the efficient and rapid exchange of information between these entities, based on a gratuitous nature. However, while the legislator does not provide direct legal sanctions for lack of cooperation on the part of the enforcement authority and the creditor, these sanctions are numerous and severe for the lack of cooperation on the part of the third-party debtor. This neglects the relationship between the third-party debtor and the obligor, which is based on voluntary and often long-term cooperation, from which both entities benefit. This relationship, from a pragmatic perspective, makes it stronger than the administrative relationship between the enforcement authority and the third-party debtor. The legislator attempts to enforce the third-party debtor’s loyalty to the enforcement authority and the creditor through deterrent sanctions, so that the latter provides only truthful, useful, and current information. Behavioral administration tools are forgotten, which, by basing cooperation on established trust, mutual kindness, and courtesy, could ensure the effectiveness of administrative enforcement not only through negative but also positive motivation.